Chukas / Balak 5780

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Just passing through[1]

נעברה-נא בארצך לא נעבר בשדה ובכרם ולא נשתה מי באר דרך המלך נלך לא נטה ימין ושמאול עד אשר-נעבר גבולך: ויאמר אליו אדום לא תעבר בי פן-בחרב אצא לקראתך
Please[2], let us pass through your land. We will not pass through field or vineyard. We will not drink the water from [our] well. [Rather], we shall walk through the path of the king[3]. We will not veer right or left until we’ve passed through your border. Edom said to him: “You shall not pass through my land, lest I encounter you with the sword”[4]

After almost forty years of traveling through the wilderness, the Jewish people finally received permission to enter the land of Israel. As they approached its borders, they encountered the land of Edom, their cousins and enemies. Edom, the nation of Yaakov’s brother Eisav, bore the same jealousy and hatred[5] towards the Jews that their ancestor had towards his brother. The Jews requested permission to pass through the land. They promised not to tread through Edom’s fields and vineyards, and to purchase food and drink from the populace[6]. Their request for permission was denied. Seemingly, the Jews were promising that their passing through the land would not only not be damaging, but even profitable. As well, the nation of Edom seemingly denied entry as they predicted their emotions would lead to fighting and bloodshed. However, is there another way to understand this exchange?

In Jewish law, land can be acquired in three ways: with money, a sale deed, or what is known as chazakah[7]. The first two are clear, but what is chazakah? Essentially, it’s an act by the purchaser which expresses ownership. For example, building a fence around a field[8]. Only the owner would do that. If this act of chazakah was done with the owner’s permission, with the intent to transfer ownership, the land now belongs to the person who performed the chazakah. There are other methods of chazakah, and some of them are subject to a dispute.

What if the purchaser simply walked across the length and width of the land? Perhaps the purchaser is showing ownership over the area that they traversed. This method of chazakah is a matter of dispute[9]. Rabbi Eliezer says that it works, and the Sages disagree. What is the reasoning of Rabbi Eliezer? The gemarra says that he learned it from Avraham. Hashem told Avraham that he would acquire the land of Israel, and that he should walk across its length and width[10]. You see then that this is a method of acquisition.

The Sages reject this source, as that command wasn’t about acquisition. Rather, they say it showed how dear Avraham was to Hashem, as this traversing of the land would make it easier for his descendants to conquer it. How was this so? By traversing the land, it would make his future descendants look like they were inheriting it from him, rather than appearing like they were stealing from the inhabitants. If the latter were the case, there would have been room for heavenly forces to influence their defeat[11]. However, the gemarra clarifies that the Sages agree to Rabbi Eliezer in the case of a path that goes through a vineyard. Since that path is exclusively made for traversing, by doing so it effects ownership[12].

With those laws in mind, subtext in the exchange between the Jewish people and the nation of Edom becomes more apparent. Geographically, the land of Edom is part of the lands of the ten nations which were promised to Avraham’s descendants[13]. As such, Edom was concerned that the Jews’ intent in passing through the land was in order to effect an acquisition of it. To alleviate this concern, the Jews said they wouldn’t pass through any field or vineyard. This was to include even the paths of the vineyards, which do in fact effect ownership. They would only walk through the regular paths that the king would allow[14], which according to the Sages wouldn’t be a valid chazakah[15].

How did the nation of Edom respond? They said they will not grant passage, lest they encounter the Jews with the sword. At first glance, this seems like an admission that as the Jews pass through, the Edomites will inevitably wage war, causing bloodshed. However, according to this gemarra about Avraham, there could be a different intent. Perhaps Edom was saying that in the future, not now, they might need or want to wage war against the Jews. However, if Edom allowed the Jews to pass through their land, this would be to their disadvantage. Just like Avraham traversed the land of Israel, making it easier for his children to conquer the land, so too the descendants of this generation. If the Jews passed through the land of Edom, it would enable their own descendants’ victory in future battles against Edom. This is why Edom refused any passage whatsoever, forcing the Jews to take another course.

Good Shabbos

[1] Based on Meshech Chochmah to Numbers 20:17,18

[2] Cf. Targum Onkelos ad. loc., who as usual translates נא as כאן, now

[3] Contrary to the implication of the popular Yaakov Shwekey song, the simple reading of the verse tells us that the path of the king refers to the king of Edom, not to Hashem. However, there are some chassidishe sources which also read the verse to be referring to the path of Hashem, such as Likkutei Moharan 20:10, Sefas Emes to Numbers 20:14 from the year 5639, Agra DeKala ad. loc., Be’er Mayim Chaim to Genesis 3:24

[4] Numbers 20:17,18

[5] See Sifrei Bamidbar § 69, brought by Rashi to Genesis 33:4: הלכה היא בידוע שעשו שונא ליעקב. It’s probably more accurately הלא בידוע, as demonstrated by Yalkut Shimoni Beha’alosecha § 722. Although, one could argue that that aphorism is specifically referring to Eisav and Yaakov, and not their descendants

[6] Rashi to v. 17

[7] Kiddushin 1:5

[8] Bava Basra 3:3

[9] Ibid 100a

[10] Genesis 13:17

[11] Rashbam ad. loc. See Pesach Einayim ad. loc.

[12] See Rashbam and Ramban ad. loc.

[13] Genesis 15:18-21 with Rashi and Bava Basra 56a with Rashbam s.v. כל שהראהו

[14] Lekach Tov to Numbers 20:17

[15] See Tosafos to Bava Basra loc. cit.

Korach 5780

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The danger of scoffing[1]

וידבר אל-קרח ואל-כל-עדתו לאמר בקר וידע יקוק את-אשר-לו וגו’ זאת עשו קחו-לכם מחתות וגו’‏
[Moshe] spoke to Korach and his assembly, saying: “Tomorrow morning it shall be known who is Hashem’s…Do this: Take for yourselves firepans”[2]

This week’s parsha details the rebellion of Korach. He challenged the leadership of Moshe and Aharon, convincing a group of the greatest sages of Israel to join his cause. Korach claimed that Moshe was making everything up[3]. He claimed that Moshe was a false prophet. Moshe challenged this band of rebels to a test to determine who was the true prophet of Hashem. The next morning, they would all take firepans and put incense on them. Through this act of Divine service, it would become clear who was Hashem’s chosen leaders. The result was that those that banded with Korach were burned to death by their firepans, whereas Moshe and Aharon emerged unscathed. This validated their rightful place as the leaders of the people, and prophets of Hashem.

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Shelach 5780

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Humble matters[1]

אלה שמות האנשים אשר-שלח משה לתור את-הארץ ויקרא משה להושע בן-נון יהושע
These are the names of the men who were sent by Moshe to scout out the land. Moshe called Hoshea the son of Nun: Yehoshua[2]

When the Jews had almost arrived at the land of Israel, they had the idea to send spies to scout out the land[3]. They wanted to know not only about the landscape, but about the inhabitants[4]. Were they a conquerable force, or not? Twelve men, one for each tribe, were selected for the task. One of them was Moshe’s faithful student[5], Yehoshua. He was originally called Hoshea, but Moshe, as a form of prayer, added the letter yud to his name, making it Yehoshua. Moshe was concerned that the spies had evil intentions, and would falsely give a negative report. He therefore added a letter from G-d’s name to Yehoshua’s, pleading that Hashem should save Yehoshua from the council of the spies[6]. What prompted Moshe to give this name change to Yehoshua? One explanation[7] is that Moshe saw Yehoshua’s great humility, and thus felt he needed this prayer[8]. What does one have to do with the other?

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Beha’alosecha 5780

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Turning curses into blessings[1]

׆ ויהי בנסע הארן ויאמר משה קומה יקוק ויפצו איביך וינסו משנאיך מפניך: ובנחו יאמר שובה יקוק רבבות אלפי ישראל: ׆
When the Ark would travel, Moshe would say: “Rise Hashem, may Your enemies scatter, may the ones who hate You flee before You.” When [the Ark] would rest he would say: “Rest Hashem, Israel’s myriads of thousands”[2]

In a standard sefer Torah, and in most standard chumashim, these two verses are surrounded by inverted letter-nuns. What are they doing here? The gemarra notes[3] that Hashem placed signs[4] before and after these verses. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel explains this was to teach us that these two verses don’t belong here[5]. After the final redemption, they will be returned to where they belong, with the descriptions of the travel formations of the tribes[6]. Why then are the verses here?

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Nasso 5780

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The value of shalom[1]

וכתב את-האלת האלה הכהן בספר ומחה אל-מי המרים
The Kohen shall write these curses on parchment, and blot it out in the bitter waters[2]

The Torah describes what’s known as the Sotah ritual. If a married woman, due to her immoral behavior, becomes a presumed adulteress[3], her and her husband cannot live together until the matter is confirmed. If she indeed committed adultery, they have to divorce. If she is in fact innocent, they can resume married life as normal. How can they clear up this scandal? The Torah provides a unique avenue for her to prove her innocence. The woman, now known as a Sotah, is taken to the Temple. Various rituals are performed, and offerings brought. This includes writing down on a piece of parchment a set of curses which are to fall on her if she is guilty. This parchment contains instances of the name of Hashem. It is then placed in a cup of bitter water, the writing dissolves, and she is to drink it. Miraculously, after the ceremony, it became clear to everyone if she is innocent or not.

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Bamidbar / Shavuos 5780

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Revealing the facets of the King[1]

איש על-דגלו באתת לבית אבתם יחנו בני ישראל מנגד סביב לאהל-מועד יחנו
The Children of Israel shall encamp, each person according to his flag, with signs according to their father’s house. They shall encamp opposite and surrounding the Tent of Meeting[2]

A significant amount of this week’s parsha describes the encampment of the Jewish people in the wilderness. In the center was the Mishkan, surrounded by the camp of the Leviim. Surrounding them were the rest of the nation, divided by their tribes. Each tribe had a specific cardinal location, with respect to the center point of the Mishkan. Each tribe is also described as having their own flag. These flags served as unique markers to distinguish each tribe from the other. They had different colors and patterns than each other[3]. However, Chazal teach us[4] that there was a greater significance to these flags than the Torah describes.

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Behar-Bechukosai 5780

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The septennial Shabbos[1]

דבר אל-בני ישראל ואמרת אלהם כי תבאו אל-הארץ אשר אני נתן לכם ושבתה הארץ שבת ליקוק
Speak to the people of Israel and say to them: “When you come to the land that I am giving you, the land will rest a Shabbos for Hashem”[2]

This parsha begins by introducing the mitzvah of the Shemittah year. The land of Israel is to lie fallow for an entire year, with no agricultural work done to it. The year is described as a Shabbos for Hashem. What does that mean? Rashi suggests[3] that it means לשם השם, for the sake of Hashem. Regarding the Shabbos of the seventh day of the week, we also find[4] the expression “Shabbos for Hashem”. There it clearly means for the sake of Hashem[5], so that’s what it should mean here. The Ramban[6] has a problem with this, since we know the Festivals are also for the sake of Hashem. Yet, we don’t find the phrase “Shabbos for Hashem” associated with any of them. Is there any other way to understand this phrase[7]?

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Emor 5780

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The desecration of ingratitude[1]

וכי-תזבחו זבח-תודה ליקוק לרצנכם תזבחו: ביום ההוא יאכל לא-תותירו ממנו עד-בקר אני יקוק: ושמרתם מצותי ועשיתם אותם אני יקוק: ולא תחללו את-שם קדשי ונקדשתי בתוך בני ישראל אני יקוק מקדשכם
When you offer a Todah offering for Hashem, it shall be offered in a way that is acceptable. It shall be eaten on that day; don’t leave any of it over until morning. I am Hashem. Safeguard my mitzvos, and perform them; I am Hashem. Don’t profane my Holy Name, and I shall be sanctified amongst the Children of Israel; I am Hashem, who sanctifies you.[2]

One type of offering that is brought in the Temple is known as a Todah offering. It consists of an animal that is offered, as well as many loaves of bread. All of these need to be consumed on the day that they are brought. After this offering is mentioned in the Torah, the prohibition against a chillul Hashem, profaning Hashem’s name, is commanded. What is the significance of this juxtaposition? What do these two mitzvos have to do with each other?

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Acharei Mos / Kedoshim 5780

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Ordinances and statutes[1]

את-משפטי תעשו ואת-חקתי תשמרו ללכת בהם אני יקוק אלקיכם
Perform my ordinances and safeguard my statutes, to walk in them; I am Hashem your G-d[2]

There’s a fundamental question regarding how to relate to mitzvos and personal inclinations[3]. What’s greater: a person who has a natural desire to break a prohibition, and overcomes their inclinations by listening to the Torah? Or someone who has no desire towards such prohibitions. It would seem from the words of our Sages[4] that the former is more meritorious. Someone who doesn’t desire to break the Torah isn’t as accomplished as someone who does yet overcomes their challenge. However, there are philosophers that say the opposite. They consider it lowly to desire to do evil, and meritorious to only desire to do good. However, this doesn’t have to be a dispute.

The Rambam suggests[5] that the Sages and philosophers are discussing different topics. There are two different types of mitzvos. One type is mitzvos that are highly logical[6]. Even if the Torah hadn’t commanded them, they would have been proper to follow[7]. These types of mitzvos, due to their inherent morality, would be repugnant to want to transgress. These logical prohibitions include murder, theft, overcharging, and damaging others’ property. There’s nothing lofty about wanting to kill someone, yet overcoming one’s baser desires and holding back. Of course it’s better to not want to kill. This is what the philosophers were discussing.

Our Sages on the other hand were discussing mitzvos that are not inherently logical. If the Torah hadn’t prohibited them, we wouldn’t have thought of them on our own. These are often referred to as Chukim, or decrees of Hashem. The Sages go as far as to say[8] that a person shouldn’t say “I’m disgusted by eating pig”[9], rather they should say “I desire to eat pig, but my Creator forbids it”. The same with the prohibition against wearing forbidden mixtures. There’s nothing wrong with desiring to wear them, as they’re not obviously immoral[10]. Once we know that Hashem commands against them, it’s meritorious to listen.

This division of mitzvos can be very readily gleamed from a verse in this week’s parsha. The Torah says את מפשטי תעשו, perform my Mishpatim, and חקתי תשמרו, safeguard my Chukim. Mishpatim are often translated as ordinances, and Chukim are often translated as statutes. More specifically, Mishpatim are the first category of mitzvos that we’ve discussed. They are mitzvos that are self evident why they were commanded. They are more obvious that they are moral. Chukim on the other hand are the second category of mitzvos. Their reasoning is not apparent to us, and we follow them because Hashem said so. Why does the Torah use the word תעשו, perform, when it comes to Mishpatim, and תשמרו, safeguard, with regards to Chukim?

Consider for a moment the following scenario: A merchant asks his friend to purchase for him some merchandise. If the merchant explicitly says, “Go here and buy this particular item”, and the friend complies, it’s not reasonable to attribute the purchase to the friend. He didn’t decide to purchase something; he merely followed his friend’s orders. Now, if the merchant were to instead say, “Go and buy merchandise”, then the purchase could be considered something the friend performed. It was enough of his own action to give him credit.

With this scenario in mind, we can have a fuller appreciation of the verse from our parsha. The Mishpatim, the mitzvos that are self-evident, are described as something to perform. This is because they are considered a mitzvah whose performance is attributed to us, because we would have done them anyways. As opposed to the Chukim, the non-logical mitzvos, which are described as something to safeguard. They’re performance is not attributed to us, similar to the friend performing the merchant’s command. They’re simply to be dutifully followed[11].

Good Shabbos

[1] Based on Sefer Apiryon by Rav Shlomo Gantzfried, the author of Kitzur Shulchan Aruch, to Leviticus 18:4

[2] Leviticus loc. cit.

[3] Shemoneh Perakim by the Rambam, Chapter 6

[4] As evident by Sukkah 52a, which says כל הגדול מחברו יצרו גדול ממנו, the greater a person is the greater their temptations. As well, the more temptations, the more reward for overcoming them (Avos 5:23)

[5] Loc. cit.

[6] Some call them מצוות שכליות. For a sampling of sources that address this type of mitzvah, see Aruch HaShulchan Orach Chaim 1:13 and Yoreh Deah 240:12, who addresses why Hashem commanded מצוות שכליות if they were self-understood, Dor Revii Chullin Pesicha Kolleles § 2 s.v. עוד משל אחת, who feels מצוות שכליות could sometimes even take precedence over explicit prohibitions, and Chavos Yair § 166, who says the rule that the Heavenly court doesn’t punish under the age of twenty (see https://parshaponders.com/pesach-5780/#_ftn12) only applies to מצוות שכליות, but not to prohibitions that are explicit in the Torah. As well, see the following sources which say that even non-Jews are obligated in all מצוות שכליות: Rav Nissim Gaon Introduction to Shas (printed at the beginning of Berachos), Rabbeinu Bachaye to Genesis 18:20, and the Netziv’s approbation to Ahavas Chesed, all brought by Minchas Asher Bereishis § 40. See also Makkos 9b, which shows that מצוות שכליות, even though they’re not explicit in the Torah, warrant punishment, even for non-Jews (this is also brought by the Chavos Yair)

[7] Yoma 67b

[8] Toras Kohanim to Leviticus 20:26, brought by Rashi ad. loc.

[9] Chazal as we have it say pig, but the Rambam loc. cit. quotes it as milk and meat. He must have had a different version. He also quotes it from Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, whereas we have it quoted from Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah. Rashi loc. cit. quotes it the way we have it, although we have אי אפשי לאכול בשר חזיר and he quotes it as נפשי קצה בבשר חזיר

[10] The Rambam loc. cit. also lists forbidden relations (עריות) as an example of Chukim. What’s surprising is Yoma loc. cit., the source for the Rambam regarding מצוות שכליות, lists עריות as something self-evidently prohibited! See Rav Kapach’s commentary to the Rambam who suggests the Rambam didn’t have עריות in his version of the gemarra. The problem is I was told by my friend R’ Ari Deifik that eight manuscripts/versions of the Talmud in our possession have the word עריות, and it is quoted by many Geonim and Rishonim as is. For another approach, see the Maharsha ad. loc. Although he has a different understanding of the gemarra than the Rambam, the way the Maharsha reads it, we don’t see עריות being classified as one of the מצוות שכליות. In any event, the Rambam is simply coming from Toras Kohanim loc. cit., which as we have it lists עריות as one of the Chukim. It would seem then to be a dispute between these two sources. One possible resolution is to suggest that the עריות in either passage are referring to different types. See Moreh Nevuchim 3:49, where the Rambam finds the prohibition of a man with his daughter to be more obviously prohibited than a man with his mother-in-law. Perhaps Yoma is discussing the former, whereas Toras Kohanim is discussing the latter

[11] Sefer Apiryon points out that Yoma loc. cit. specifically uses our verse to distinguish between the two types of mitzvos. It could have used many other verses which speak of משפטים and חוקים (for example, Leviticus 19:37 and Deuteronomy 4:14). He suggests that it is because it was bothered by this distinction between תעשו with משפטים and תשמרו with חוקים that specifically our verse uses[Print]

Tazria / Metzora 5780

5780 28 Tazria Metzora

The proper precedence[1]

…אשה כי תזריע וילדה זכר וטמאה שבעת ימים וגו’‏
…when a woman gives birth to a boy, she shall be spiritually impure for seven days…[2]

At the end of the previous parsha[3], there were many details related to the spiritual impurity imparted by animals. This week’s parsha begins a long series of laws related to the spiritual purity and impurity of humans. Seemingly, the order is backwards. Since mankind is the principle player in the Torah, shouldn’t their laws come first? That which is primary takes precedence over what is secondary. Why then are the laws of animals taught first? Rashi addresses this[4], by reminding us that in the Torah’s description of creation, first the animals were created[5], and only then mankind[6]. Just like the animals preceded Man during creation, their laws of impurity are taught first.

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