Shemos 5785

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Fateful forefather fenagling[1]

ויאמר עוד אלקים אל משה כה תאמר אל בני ישראל יקוק אלקי אבותיכם אלקי אברהם אלקי יצחק ואלקי יעקב שלנחי אליכם זה שמי לעולם וזה זכרי לדור דור: לך ואספת את זקני ישראל ואמרת אליהם יקוק אלקי אבותיכם נראה אלי אלקי אברהם יצחק ויעקב לאמר פקד פקדתי אתכם ואת העשוי לכם במצרים
G-d said further to Moshe: “Thus shall you say to the Children of Israel: Hashem, the G-d of your forefathers, the G-d of Avraham, the G-d of Yitzchak, and the G-d of Yaakov, sent me to you. This is My Name forever, and My remembrance from generation to generation. Go and gather the elders of Israel and say to them: Hashem, the G-d of your forefathers appeared to me, the G-d of Avraham, Yitzchak, and Yaakov, saying, I have surely remembered you and what was done to you in Egypt”[2]

Everyone knows the episode of the burning bush. Hashem appeared to Moshe in a vision and told him that he would be the one to redeem the Jewish people from their bondage in Egypt. What’s interesting is we find back-to-back verses where Hashem describes Himself as the G-d of our forefathers. More interesting is we find an inconsistency. First, Hashem describes Himself as the G-d of Avraham, the G-d of Yitzchak, and the G-d of Yaakov. The second time, however, He simply calls Himself the G-d of Avraham, Yitzchak, and Yaakov, without repetition. Why the inconsistency?

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Vayechi 5785

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Forgiveness consequences[1]

ויצוו אל-יוסף לאמר אביך צוה לפני מותו לאמר: כה-תאמרו ליוסף אנא שא נא פשע אחיך וחטאתם כי-רעה גמולך ועתה שא נא לפשע עבדי אלקי אביך ויבק יוסף בדברם אליו
[The brothers] commanded Yosef, saying: “Your father commanded before his death, saying: ‘Thus shall you say to Yosef: Please forgive the iniquity of your brothers, and their sins, for they have bestowed bad upon you. Now, please forgive the iniquity of the servants of the G-d of your father’” Yosef wept as they spoke to them[2]

We find that the brothers asked Yosef to forgive them for selling him into slavery. Although Yosef cried at their request, we don’t find explicitly that he forgave them. We know that even if someone repents for the wrong they’ve done to their friend, if the friend doesn’t forgive the sin isn’t fully atoned[3]. If Yosef never forgave them, that means the brothers died without the proper atonement. As a result, our Sages tell us[4] that the ten famous Sages who were martyred by the Romans, known as the Asara Harugei Malchus, including giants like Rabbi Akiva, were reincarnations of the ten sons of Yaakov[5]. They were brutally killed in order to provide the necessary atonement for the sin of selling Yosef[6].

However, Sefer Chassidim understands[7] that Yosef indeed forgave the brothers[8]. It writes that someone who is truly pious is someone who is able to overcome their middos as be forgiving. Yosef is given as the prime example. How then can we understand why were the brothers punished with reincarnating as the Asara Harugei Malchus? The Chida suggests[9] that the brothers sinned doubly. Although they sinned against Yosef and he forgave them, they also sinned against Hashem. The sale of Yosef became a public scandal, known to the Egyptians and Pharaoh. This created a terrible Chillul Hashem. Their teshuva wasn’t enough to fully undo the blemish, and they needed further atonement.

Although, Rav Elyashiv is quoted[10] as bringing an explicit gemarra against the Sefer Chassidim. We see that Yosef didn’t end up forgiving his brothers. What’s the proof? The gemarra in Yoma teaches us[11] that if one needs to seek forgiveness for the wrongdoing he did to his friend, he only needs to ask them three times. The gemarra derives this from our verse with the brothers asking Yosef for forgiveness. There, there’s three expressions requesting forgiveness. If Yosef indeed forgave them, what’s the proof? Maybe they stopped after three times because he forgave them! It must be that he didn’t forgive them, and nevertheless they didn’t need to ask more than three times[12].

Why wouldn’t Yosef forgive the brothers? They were clearly remorseful for what they had done. Yosef even said that only good came from their terrible deed[13]. Some suggest[14] that for the pain and suffering he endured, Yosef surely forgave them. However, one thing was beyond forgiveness. The Torah that Yosef learned from his father Yaakov was so precious to him. All those years of learning with him that were lost can never be replaced. They were of infinite value, and he was thus unable to forgive them for that[15].

Good Shabbos

[1] Based on a devar Torah heard from Rav Yitzchak Horowitz of Givat HaMivtar

[2] Genesis 50:16-17

[3] Bava Kamma 92a

[4] Zohar Chadash Eicha, p. 37; Midrash Mishlei 1:13

[5] Ten, because Yosef obviously didn’t sell himself, and Binyamin wasn’t culpable. A question that is asked is that Reuven also wasn’t culpable, as he wasn’t complicit in the sale. Several answers have been proposed. Zohar Chadash loc. cit. says that Reuven reincarnated into Rabbi Eliezer HaGadol, who wasn’t actually killed, but merely imprisoned. This implies that the name Asara Harugei Malchus isn’t literal. However, Benei Yissaschar Chodesh Tishrei § 12 explains that even though Reuven’s reincarnation was spared, the other brothers were reincarnated into ten. Either he means the 9 were somehow divided into 10, or either Binyamin or Yosef are somehow also held accountable. Yalkut Reuveni to Genesis 37:8 first suggests that Reuven was punished for moving Yaakov’s bed, and then cites Sha’ar HaGilgulim Hakdma § 31 and Chessed L’Avraham Ein Mishpat, Nahar § 25 that Yosef was punished for inciting the brothers to hate him

[6] Rabbeinu Bachaye to Genesis loc. cit.

[7] Sefer Chassidim § 11

[8] This is also explicit in Midrash Tehillim § 10

[9] Bris Olam to Sefer Chassidim loc. cit.

[10] Rav Horowitz cited this from Rav Elyashiv. I also found it in MiShulchan Rav Eliyahu Baruch to v. 17. Interestingly, He’aros Rav Elyashiv to Yoma 87a brings an interpretation that Yosef immediately forgave his brothers, yet we see from their triple expression that this is all this necessary to ask. Maharsha ad. loc. says the same. See also Chashukei Chemed to Niddah 31b, where Rav Zilberstein brings himself Yoma 87a as a proof for a related teaching of his father-in-law Rav Elyashiv, that even after asking for forgiveness three times, the person isn’t necessarily exempt from further atonement. We see the brothers were indeed punished, even though they did their due diligence of asking for forgiveness

[11] Yoma 87a

[12] Cf. Maharsha ad. loc.

[13] Ibid v. 20

[14] Rav Horowitz cited this from Rav Mordechai Tzuckerman, in the name of the Chofetz Chaim. I saw that MiShulchan Rav Eliyahu Baruch loc. cit. also cited this from Rav Tzuckerman

[15] MiShulchan Rav Eliyahu Baruch remains at a loss how Yosef could be cruel to his brothers when halacha requires him to be forgiving. Rav Aryeh Leib Shteinman in Ayeles HaShachar ad. loc. suggests instead that while Yosef wanted to forgive them, it was beyond his present abilities. Rav Shteinman cites a related story of Rav Eliyahu Lopian who, when asked for forgiveness, asked for a couple of weeks so he could ensure the forgiveness was completely sincere

Vayigash 5785

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Night visions and exile assurances[1]

ויאמר אלקים במראת הלילה ויאמר יעקב יעקב
G-d spoke in a night vision, and He said: “Yaakov, Yaakov”[2]

We don’t find that Hashem spoke to Avraham or Yitzchak in a night vision. We only find it in this instance with Yaakov, as well as when he had his famous dream about the ladder going to heaven. The reason is because in both instances he was ready and prepared to move to outside the land of Israel, to dwell there. The ladder case, when he was going to live with Lavan, and now, when he was going to live with Yosef in Egypt.

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Vayeishev 5785

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Names, visions, and important stones[1]

…ויבא הביתה לעשות מלאכתו ואין איש מאנשי הבית שם בבית
[Yosef] went to the house to “do his work”, and there was no one else in the house [2]

While Yosef was a slave in Egypt, his master Potiphar’s wife was relentless. She wouldn’t give up on trying to seduce the attractive teenager. Day in and day out she would try different tactics to gain his attention. Yosef wouldn’t budge, as he knew that adultery was a terrible crime. One day, the Torah says that Yosef went to his house to “do his work”. Some say[3] that this is literal, and he was going to work on some bookkeeping for his master. Others say[4] that this is a euphemism for him finally caving into Potiphar’s wife’s seduction. However, even according to that opinion, Yosef took hold of himself and abstained.

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Vayishlach 5785

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Capital conflict and circumcision[1]

ויהי ביום השלישי בהיותם כאבים ויקחו שני-בני-יעקב שמעון ולוי אחי דינה איש חרבו ויבאו על-העיר בטח ויהרגו כל-זכר: ויאמר יעקב אל-שמעון ואל-לוי עכרתם אתי להבאישני בישב הארץ וגו’‏
And it was, on the third day, when [the residents of Shechem] were in pain, the two sons of Yaakov, Levi and Shimon, the brothers of Dina, each one took their sword and went to the city, confident. They killed every male. Yaakov said to Shimon and to Levi: “You have disgraced[2] me, causing enmity between me and the dwellers of the land”…[3]

The tragic episode of the violation of Dina is unfortunately well known. Shechem, a prominent Canaanite, kidnapped Yaakov’s daughter after violating her, intending to marry her. He tried to convince Yaakov’s family to accept this opportune arrangement. The sons of Yaakov cunningly demanded that the entire city of Shechem first circumcise themselves, and then they can discuss. The inhabitants agreed, and on the third day of their recovery, when they were in the most pain, Shimon and Levi killed all those in the city. They rescued their sister Dina, and Yaakov rebuked them. What were Shimon and Levi thinking? How was it justified to kill everyone? Why didn’t Yaakov agree?

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Toldos 5785

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Evading enslavement, harboring heresy[1]

ויזד יעקב נזיד ויבא עשו מן-השדה והוא עיף
Yaakov stewed a stew, and Eisav came from the fields, exhausted[2]

When Avraham died, Yaakov made a lentil stew to comfort his father Yitzchak[3]. Our Sages tell us[4] that when Eisav, Yaakov’s brother, came from the field, he inquired to the nature of this lentil stew. Yaakov informed him that Avraham had died. Eisav asked that Hashem’s attribute of judgment even had its way with Avraham? Yaakov replied that yes, that was the case. Eisav responded that if so, there’s no Judge, there’s no Justice[5]. Meaning, Eisav at that moment denied the reality of Hashem. This is a very difficult teaching. Why did Eisav choose now, of all times, to become a heretic? Did he really think that Avraham would live forever? Hashem made a covenant with Avraham that, “You will come to your forefathers in peace and be buried at a ripe old age”[6]. What then was so surprising[7]?

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Chayei Sarah 5785

 

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Proper pet precedence[1]

ותמהר ותורד כדה מעליה ותאמר שתה וגם-גמליך אשקה ואשת וגם הגמלים השקתה
She hurried and lowered her jug from upon her and said, “Drink, and also I’ll give water to your camels.” I drank and she also gave water to my camels.[2]

There’s an interesting law we derive from the language of a verse in Shema. “I will give the grass of your fields to your animals, and you will eat and you will be satiated.”[3] From here[4] our Sages teach that it is prohibited to eat before feeding one’s animals. This is how the teaching is expressed. As a result, some[5] want to infer that only a prominent eating session is prohibited, meaning a bread meal, before feeding one’s animals. Having a light snack would be permitted. In other contexts, our Sages expressed forbidden tasting, but here they mention eating. This is also inferred from the verse which is the source of this prohibition, as it says “you will eat and you will be satiated”. Only eating to satiation is forbidden before feeding one’s animals. A light snack would be fine.

The problem is, this teaching is repeated in a different context[6]. There, the text as we have it says it is forbidden to taste anything before feeding one’s animal. True, there seems to be an inconsistency in the proper text, but the prominent halachic authorities[7] quote this version of the text. Even according to the text which says, “it’s prohibited to eat”, we can deflect the inference that tasting is permitted.

The Sefer Chassidim derives[8] from a verse in our parsha that even though it is prohibited to eat before feeding one’s animals, it is permitted to drink before giving a drink to one’s animals. When Eliezer went to find a mate for his master’s son Yitzchak, he brought along his camels on his journey. He quickly found Rivka, who promptly offered him water, as well as his camels. Rivka was exceedingly righteous, and we see from her behavior that drinking isn’t included in this prohibition. She first offered Eliezer, and only afterwards offered the animals.

One could say then that this is the reason why the gemarra says it is prohibited to eat before feeding one’s animals. True, one cannot even have a snack, but if it said it’s prohibited to taste before, I would think even drinking is included. It explicitly said eating, to exclude drinking from the prohibition. However, even the tiniest snack would be included in this prohibition[9].

The problem is, as we said, the accepted text is that the gemarra does say it is forbidden to taste before feeding one’s animal. This would include drinking, precluding the innovation of the Sefer Chassidim. Even logically, it’s hard to discern what should be the difference. It’s harder when one is thirsty than when one is hungry. If we’re supposed to take care of our animal first, if it’s thirsty, all the more so we should give it to drink before ourselves!

How then should we understand the actions of Rivka? The renowned Chasam Sofer suggested the following distinction. The difference isn’t food and drink. Rather, it’s whose food and animal are we discussing. When it comes to my food and my animal, the animal comes first. My animal is my responsibility, and my food is there to provide for the animal before even myself. However, when someone gives me food or drink as a gift, I have no obligation to give that food or drink to the animal first. The giver has the right to decide what happens with the food or drink. Since Rivka was giving water to Eliezer, he had the right to drink first[10].

Either way, we see the sensitivity the Torah has towards all creatures[11]. Although in many ways human beings take precedence over animals, the Torah requires us to inculcate within ourselves the attitude of thinking outside ourselves. We often are responsible for others, be it our children, students, or even animals. Sometimes our needs need to be pushed aside for those who are dependent upon us. May we always be able to learn the proper attitude from our forefathers and foremothers.

Good Shabbos

[1] Based on Teshuvos Kesav Sofer Orach Chaim § 32

[2] Genesis 24:46

[3] Deuteronomy 11:15

[4] Berachos 40a

[5] Taz to Shulchan Aruch Orach Chaim 167:7

[6] Gittin 62a

[7] Rif and Rosh to Berachos loc. cit. This is pointed out by the Mesoras HaShas ad. loc.

[8] Sefer Chassidim § 531, brought by Magen Avraham ad. loc. § 18

[9] See Kesav Sofer, who also addresses the other inference of “you will eat and be satiated”

[10] Tangentially, there’s a somewhat similar prohibition of eating or drinking before praying (Berachos 8b; Shulchan Aruch Orach Chaim 89:3). See Teshuvos Beis Naftali § 8-9, who also derives a leniency in this matter from Rivka’s behavior

[11] See Rav Asher Weiss’ analysis if this prohibition is from the Torah, Rabbinic, or merely the behavior of the pious: https://m.torahbase.org/pdf/Chayei_Sarah_he_85.pdf

Vayeira 5785

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Dust and ash[1]

ויען אברהם ויאמר הנה-נא הואלתי לדבר אל-אדנ”י ואנכי עפר ואפר
Avraham answered and said, “Behold, now I have begun to speak to the Lord. I am but dirt and ash”[2]

Our Sages tell us[3] that in the merit that Avraham called himself “but dirt and ash”, his descendants were given the mitzvos of the dirt of the Sotah procedure[4] and the ash of the Parah Adumah, the Red Heifer[5]. Now, it’s true, we see that Avraham said dirt and ash, and these two mitzvos are with dirt and ash. Still, is there any deeper significance with this reward?

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Lech Lecha 5785

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Proclaiming the greatness of Hashem[1]

ויאמר אברם אל-מלך סדם הרמתי ידי אל-יקוק קל עליון קנה שמים וארץ: אם-מחוט ועד שרוך-נעל ואם-אקח מכל-אשר-לך ולא תאמר אני העשרתי את-אברם
Avram said to the king of Sedom: “I raise my hand to Hashem, the Supernal G-d, the Owner of Heaven and Earth. I will take neither a string nor a shoe strap, nor anything that is yours, so you will not say that I made Avram rich”[2]

Avraham heroically rescued his nephew Lot who was kidnapped by the mightiest kings of the time. Simultaneously, Avraham rescued the king of Sedom. The king offered Avraham the spoils of the war, but Avraham vehemently refused. He announced he wouldn’t even take a string or a shoe strap from the spoils. Our Sages teach us[3] that in the merit of this proclamation, his children merited the mitzvah of the string of techeiles on their tzitzis, and the mitzvah of the strap of tefillin. How can we understand the midah k’neged midah, the measure for measure of this reward? Meaning, why did Hashem find these mitzvos to be an appropriate response to this act of piety? Rashi clarifies[4] that part of the merit was that Avraham didn’t want to benefit from theft, but what theft was there here? Avraham was the victor of the battle…

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Sukkos 5785

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Anti-agent activities[1]

בסוכות תשבו שבעת ימים…‏
You shall dwell in Sukkos for seven days[2]

In Jewish law there’s the concept of Agency[3]. Meaning, I can appoint an agent to perform certain acts on my behalf, such as betrothing a wife, ending a marriage, separating tithes, and slaughtering offerings. A question that is asked[4] is that logic would dictate that agency shouldn’t work for the mitzvah of Sukkah, but why not? Why can’t I have someone else dwell in the Sukkah on my behalf? Why should it be different than the above mitzvos? Similarly, why can’t I have someone else wear Tefillin for me?

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