Tzav 5782

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Thoughts of denial[1]

…זאת תורה העלה…
…This is the law of the Olah offering…[2]

Of the many offerings that can be brought in the Temple, the one that is entirely consumed in flames is known as the Olah offering. While some offerings are brought voluntarily, and some to atone for immoral actions, our Sages teach us[3] that an Olah offering is brought to atone for improper thoughts. What’s the source for this idea? They tell us that it’s an explicit verse, which says: והעלה על-רוחכם היו לא תהיה, אשר אתם אומרים נהיה כגוים, That which goes up in your mind shall never come to pass, that you say that you’ll be like all the nations[4]. Now, the word for “that which goes up” is the same word as an Olah offering, which entirely “goes up” to Hashem. As such, we see the Olah offering associated with thoughts, and in the context of the verse, bad ones. Now, it’s hard to call this an explicit verse for this idea. It’s more of an allusion than anything else[5].

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Vayikra / Zachor 5782

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King Shaul’s error[1]

ויבא שמואל אל-שאול ויאמר לו שאול ברוך אתה ליקוק הקימתי את-דבר יקוק: ויאמר שמואל ומה קול-הצאן הזה באזני וקול הבקר אשר אנכי שמע וגו’ הלוא אם-קטן אתה בעיניך ראש שבטי ישראל אתה וגו’‏
Shmuel came to Shaul, and Shaul said to him: “You are blessed to Hashem! I have fulfilled the word of Hashem”. Shmuel said: “Then what is this sound of the sheep that is in my ears? And the sound of the cattle which I hear? … You may be small in your eyes, but you are the head of the tribes of Israel!…[2]

The haftarah for parshas Zachor details the failure of King Shaul to eradicate the wicked nation of Amalek. Shmuel the prophet ordered Shaul to leave no person or animal alive, as Hashem told Moshe[3] that we are to blot out the memory of Amalek. Shaul however left alive the king of Amalek known as Agag, the ancestor to Haman[4]. He also left alive their sheep and cows, intending to bring them as offerings for Hashem. Shmuel harshly reprimanded Shaul for his failure, and Shaul lost the kingship as a result of his sin.

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Emor 5781

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Future allusions[1]

דבר אל-בני ישראל לאמר בחדש השביעי באחד לחדש יהיה לכם שבתון זכרון תרועה מקרא-קדש: אך בעשור לחדש השביעי הזה יום הכפרים הוא מקרא-קדש יהיה לכם וגו’ דבר אל-בני ישראל לאמר בחמשה עשר יום לחדש השביעי הזה חג הסכות שבעת ימים ליקוק: אך בחמשה עשר יום לחדש השביעי וגו’ ולקחתם לכם ביום הראשון פרי עץ הדר כפת תמרים וענף עץ-עבת וערבי נחל וגו’‏
Tell the Children of Israel, saying: “In the seventh month, on the first of the month, it shall be for you a day of rest. A remembrance of shofar blasts, a holy convocation. However, on the tenth of this seventh month, it is Yom Kippur. It shall be for you a holy convocation…” Tell the Children of Israel, saying: “On the fifteenth of this seventh month, [it is] the festival of Sukkos, seven days for Hashem. However, on the fifteenth of the seventh month…you shall take on the first day a beautiful fruit, palm fronds, braided branches, and willows…”[2]

If we examine the description of the holidays, we’ll notice a strange inconsistency. The month of Tishrei contains many festivals. First there’s Rosh Hashanah, then Yom Kippur, and then Sukkos. The Torah specifies that these holidays occur in the seventh month of the Jewish calendar. Rosh Hashanah is on the first, Yom Kippur is on the tenth, and Sukkos starts on the fifteenth. When the Torah refers to Yom Kippur, it specifies that it is in this seventh month. For Sukkos, it first says the same as Yom Kippur, this seventh month. The second time it refers to Sukkos, in the context of the mitzvah of the four species, it just says the seventh month. Why is there this inconsistency[3]?

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Acharei Mos / Kedoshim 5781

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True holiness[1]

דבר אל-כל-עדת בני-ישראל ואמרת אלהם קדשים תהיו כי קדוש אני יקוק אלקיכם: איש אמו ואביו תיראו ואת-שבתתי תשמרו אני יקוק אלקיכם: אל-תפנו אל-האלילם וגו’ וכי תזבחו זבח שלמים ליקוק וגו’‏
Speak to the entire congregation of the Children of Israel and say to them: “You shall be Holy, for I am Holy; I am Hashem your G-d. You shall revere your mother and father, and you shall observe My Shabbos; I am Hashem your G-d. Do not turn towards the false gods…When you offer a peace offering to Hashem…[2]

Parshas Kedoshim is chockfull of mitzvos, both interpersonal and between man and G-d. Sometimes it is hard to discern why the mitzvos are presented they way they are, but if one were to investigate thoroughly, sometimes their labor will be fruitful. One such example is at the very beginning of the parsha. We are told to be Holy, for Hashem is Holy. Then we are told to revere our parents, and observe Shabbos. Then we are warned against idolatry, which is followed by the concept of bringing a voluntary peace offering to Hashem. What can we glean from the juxtaposition of these mitzvos?

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Tazria / Metzora 5781

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The difference between a Metzora and a Kohen[1]

אדם וגו’ והיה בעור-בשרו לנגע צרעת והובא אל-אהרן הכהן או אל-אחד מבניו הכהנים: ויצא הכהן אל-מחוץ למחנה וראה הכהן והנה נרפא נגע-הצרעת מן-הצרוע
When a person…develops a tzara’as affliction on their skin, he shall be brought to Aharon the Kohen, or to one of his sons, the Kohanim… The Kohen shall go outside the camp and he shall see, and behold! The afflicted person’s tzara’as affliction has healed![2]

This week’s double parsha mostly deals with the laws of tzara’as, most commonly translated as leprosy. While being a whitish skin condition, in reality it’s a totally unrelated spiritual malady[3] with physical symptoms. Chazal tell us[4] that someone who contracts tzara’as, known as a Metzora[5], usually committed a certain sin[6]. One example is that of loshon hara, evil speech. As a result of his sin, he is infected with a disturbing skin condition, and has to have his status established by a Kohen. If the Kohen determines he is spiritually pure, then he is. The opposite is also true.

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Shemini 5781

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To be satisfied with one’s lot[1]

כל מפרסת פרסה ושסעת שסע פרסת מעלת גרה בבהמה אתה תאכלו
All domesticated animals which have completely split hooves, and that chew their cud, those you shall eat[2]

The Torah gives us two signs for domesticated animals to determine their kosher status. Only if they have מפרסת פרסה ושסעת שסע פרסות, completely split hooves, and are מעלה גרה, that they chew their cud. The Torah lists four animals that have one of these two signs, but not both. The גמל, the camel, the שפן, the hyrax, and the ארנבת, the hare[3], are all מעלה גרה, but don’t have completely split hooves. In contrast, the חזיר, the pig, has split hooves (just like a cow). However, it does not chew its cud. This is for domesticated animals.

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Vayikra 5781

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A desire to give[1]

ואם-תקריב מנחת בכורים ליקוק וגו’‏
If you bring your first fruit offering to Hashem…[2]

There are three mitzvos in the Torah that start with the word אם, usually translated as “if”. ואם-מזבח אבנים תעשה-לי, the mitzvah to build an altar[3]. אם כסף תלוה, the mitzvah to lend money, and more generally the mitzvah of tzedakah[4]. Finally, a verse in this week’s parsha, אם תקריב מנחת בכורים, the mitzvah to bring bikkurim, one’s first fruits as an offering in the Temple[5]. If אם is translated as “if”, these verses are saying: “if you build an altar”, “if you give tzedakah”, “if you bring the offering”. Rashi assures us[6] that these are not voluntary mitzvos, but rather bona fide commands. Why then are they expressed in an optional way?

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Behar-Bechukosai 5780

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The septennial Shabbos[1]

דבר אל-בני ישראל ואמרת אלהם כי תבאו אל-הארץ אשר אני נתן לכם ושבתה הארץ שבת ליקוק
Speak to the people of Israel and say to them: “When you come to the land that I am giving you, the land will rest a Shabbos for Hashem”[2]

This parsha begins by introducing the mitzvah of the Shemittah year. The land of Israel is to lie fallow for an entire year, with no agricultural work done to it. The year is described as a Shabbos for Hashem. What does that mean? Rashi suggests[3] that it means לשם השם, for the sake of Hashem. Regarding the Shabbos of the seventh day of the week, we also find[4] the expression “Shabbos for Hashem”. There it clearly means for the sake of Hashem[5], so that’s what it should mean here. The Ramban[6] has a problem with this, since we know the Festivals are also for the sake of Hashem. Yet, we don’t find the phrase “Shabbos for Hashem” associated with any of them. Is there any other way to understand this phrase[7]?

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Emor 5780

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The desecration of ingratitude[1]

וכי-תזבחו זבח-תודה ליקוק לרצנכם תזבחו: ביום ההוא יאכל לא-תותירו ממנו עד-בקר אני יקוק: ושמרתם מצותי ועשיתם אותם אני יקוק: ולא תחללו את-שם קדשי ונקדשתי בתוך בני ישראל אני יקוק מקדשכם
When you offer a Todah offering for Hashem, it shall be offered in a way that is acceptable. It shall be eaten on that day; don’t leave any of it over until morning. I am Hashem. Safeguard my mitzvos, and perform them; I am Hashem. Don’t profane my Holy Name, and I shall be sanctified amongst the Children of Israel; I am Hashem, who sanctifies you.[2]

One type of offering that is brought in the Temple is known as a Todah offering. It consists of an animal that is offered, as well as many loaves of bread. All of these need to be consumed on the day that they are brought. After this offering is mentioned in the Torah, the prohibition against a chillul Hashem, profaning Hashem’s name, is commanded. What is the significance of this juxtaposition? What do these two mitzvos have to do with each other?

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Acharei Mos / Kedoshim 5780

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Ordinances and statutes[1]

את-משפטי תעשו ואת-חקתי תשמרו ללכת בהם אני יקוק אלקיכם
Perform my ordinances and safeguard my statutes, to walk in them; I am Hashem your G-d[2]

There’s a fundamental question regarding how to relate to mitzvos and personal inclinations[3]. What’s greater: a person who has a natural desire to break a prohibition, and overcomes their inclinations by listening to the Torah? Or someone who has no desire towards such prohibitions. It would seem from the words of our Sages[4] that the former is more meritorious. Someone who doesn’t desire to break the Torah isn’t as accomplished as someone who does yet overcomes their challenge. However, there are philosophers that say the opposite. They consider it lowly to desire to do evil, and meritorious to only desire to do good. However, this doesn’t have to be a dispute.

The Rambam suggests[5] that the Sages and philosophers are discussing different topics. There are two different types of mitzvos. One type is mitzvos that are highly logical[6]. Even if the Torah hadn’t commanded them, they would have been proper to follow[7]. These types of mitzvos, due to their inherent morality, would be repugnant to want to transgress. These logical prohibitions include murder, theft, overcharging, and damaging others’ property. There’s nothing lofty about wanting to kill someone, yet overcoming one’s baser desires and holding back. Of course it’s better to not want to kill. This is what the philosophers were discussing.

Our Sages on the other hand were discussing mitzvos that are not inherently logical. If the Torah hadn’t prohibited them, we wouldn’t have thought of them on our own. These are often referred to as Chukim, or decrees of Hashem. The Sages go as far as to say[8] that a person shouldn’t say “I’m disgusted by eating pig”[9], rather they should say “I desire to eat pig, but my Creator forbids it”. The same with the prohibition against wearing forbidden mixtures. There’s nothing wrong with desiring to wear them, as they’re not obviously immoral[10]. Once we know that Hashem commands against them, it’s meritorious to listen.

This division of mitzvos can be very readily gleamed from a verse in this week’s parsha. The Torah says את מפשטי תעשו, perform my Mishpatim, and חקתי תשמרו, safeguard my Chukim. Mishpatim are often translated as ordinances, and Chukim are often translated as statutes. More specifically, Mishpatim are the first category of mitzvos that we’ve discussed. They are mitzvos that are self evident why they were commanded. They are more obvious that they are moral. Chukim on the other hand are the second category of mitzvos. Their reasoning is not apparent to us, and we follow them because Hashem said so. Why does the Torah use the word תעשו, perform, when it comes to Mishpatim, and תשמרו, safeguard, with regards to Chukim?

Consider for a moment the following scenario: A merchant asks his friend to purchase for him some merchandise. If the merchant explicitly says, “Go here and buy this particular item”, and the friend complies, it’s not reasonable to attribute the purchase to the friend. He didn’t decide to purchase something; he merely followed his friend’s orders. Now, if the merchant were to instead say, “Go and buy merchandise”, then the purchase could be considered something the friend performed. It was enough of his own action to give him credit.

With this scenario in mind, we can have a fuller appreciation of the verse from our parsha. The Mishpatim, the mitzvos that are self-evident, are described as something to perform. This is because they are considered a mitzvah whose performance is attributed to us, because we would have done them anyways. As opposed to the Chukim, the non-logical mitzvos, which are described as something to safeguard. They’re performance is not attributed to us, similar to the friend performing the merchant’s command. They’re simply to be dutifully followed[11].

Good Shabbos

[1] Based on Sefer Apiryon by Rav Shlomo Gantzfried, the author of Kitzur Shulchan Aruch, to Leviticus 18:4

[2] Leviticus loc. cit.

[3] Shemoneh Perakim by the Rambam, Chapter 6

[4] As evident by Sukkah 52a, which says כל הגדול מחברו יצרו גדול ממנו, the greater a person is the greater their temptations. As well, the more temptations, the more reward for overcoming them (Avos 5:23)

[5] Loc. cit.

[6] Some call them מצוות שכליות. For a sampling of sources that address this type of mitzvah, see Aruch HaShulchan Orach Chaim 1:13 and Yoreh Deah 240:12, who addresses why Hashem commanded מצוות שכליות if they were self-understood, Dor Revii Chullin Pesicha Kolleles § 2 s.v. עוד משל אחת, who feels מצוות שכליות could sometimes even take precedence over explicit prohibitions, and Chavos Yair § 166, who says the rule that the Heavenly court doesn’t punish under the age of twenty (see https://parshaponders.com/pesach-5780/#_ftn12) only applies to מצוות שכליות, but not to prohibitions that are explicit in the Torah. As well, see the following sources which say that even non-Jews are obligated in all מצוות שכליות: Rav Nissim Gaon Introduction to Shas (printed at the beginning of Berachos), Rabbeinu Bachaye to Genesis 18:20, and the Netziv’s approbation to Ahavas Chesed, all brought by Minchas Asher Bereishis § 40. See also Makkos 9b, which shows that מצוות שכליות, even though they’re not explicit in the Torah, warrant punishment, even for non-Jews (this is also brought by the Chavos Yair)

[7] Yoma 67b

[8] Toras Kohanim to Leviticus 20:26, brought by Rashi ad. loc.

[9] Chazal as we have it say pig, but the Rambam loc. cit. quotes it as milk and meat. He must have had a different version. He also quotes it from Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, whereas we have it quoted from Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah. Rashi loc. cit. quotes it the way we have it, although we have אי אפשי לאכול בשר חזיר and he quotes it as נפשי קצה בבשר חזיר

[10] The Rambam loc. cit. also lists forbidden relations (עריות) as an example of Chukim. What’s surprising is Yoma loc. cit., the source for the Rambam regarding מצוות שכליות, lists עריות as something self-evidently prohibited! See Rav Kapach’s commentary to the Rambam who suggests the Rambam didn’t have עריות in his version of the gemarra. The problem is I was told by my friend R’ Ari Deifik that eight manuscripts/versions of the Talmud in our possession have the word עריות, and it is quoted by many Geonim and Rishonim as is. For another approach, see the Maharsha ad. loc. Although he has a different understanding of the gemarra than the Rambam, the way the Maharsha reads it, we don’t see עריות being classified as one of the מצוות שכליות. In any event, the Rambam is simply coming from Toras Kohanim loc. cit., which as we have it lists עריות as one of the Chukim. It would seem then to be a dispute between these two sources. One possible resolution is to suggest that the עריות in either passage are referring to different types. See Moreh Nevuchim 3:49, where the Rambam finds the prohibition of a man with his daughter to be more obviously prohibited than a man with his mother-in-law. Perhaps Yoma is discussing the former, whereas Toras Kohanim is discussing the latter

[11] Sefer Apiryon points out that Yoma loc. cit. specifically uses our verse to distinguish between the two types of mitzvos. It could have used many other verses which speak of משפטים and חוקים (for example, Leviticus 19:37 and Deuteronomy 4:14). He suggests that it is because it was bothered by this distinction between תעשו with משפטים and תשמרו with חוקים that specifically our verse uses[Print]